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Introduction
According to the concept of populism as a thin ideology, the general structure of popu-
list political narration can be augmented with hard ideology referring to permanent sets 
of values or topics (Stanley, 2008). Hence, one area of research in populist political 
communication is the analysis of issues or events that, when covered or discussed, trig-
ger the use of populist discourse (Esser et al., 2019).
For the purpose of this study, we are using a heuristic model to analyse populist 
political communication (Reinemann et al., 2017, pp. 21–23). The model includes four 
key elements at three levels of social analysis: (1) Structural and situational context at 
the macro-level; (2) Parties, movements, and their representatives at the meso-level; 
(3) Journalistic and social media at the meso-level; (4) Individual citizens at the micro-
level (Reinemann et al., 2017, p. 21). In this chapter, we will focus on structural and 
situational context at the macro-level. The contextual factors include relatively stable 
features such as characteristics of political and media systems, or a political and jour-
nalistic culture, as well as historical experience, ethnic issues, and previous internation-
al relations (Urbinati, 2013), while situational factors are related to real-world political, 
social, economic, or cultural events, issues, challenges, and phenomena (Reinemann et 
al., 2017, p. 21).
Some situational factors that can influence the presence of populist discourse in me-
dia coverage are indicated by the results of research investigating the conditions which 
facilitate the emergence of populist actors, such as deteriorating economic conditions, 
unemployment, and modernization (Stavrakakis and Katsambekis, 2014; Kioupkiolis, 
2016; Rooduijn and Akkerman, 2017; Rico and Anduiza, 2019). Certain studies also 
show that a rise of populism may be triggered by an increased sense of threat posed by 
migrants (Scheepers et al., 2002; Koopmans and Muis, 2009). However, a longitudinal 
study on media coverage of immigration (Esser et al., 2019) revealed no convincing 
empirical evidence for a direct relation between increased populism in news stories on 
immigration and immigration-related real world trends or growing public concerns about 
immigration. But, as the authors claim, “this does not mean that the events and concerns 
of the population do not play a role, but rather that they are not the main explanatory fac-
tors for how much populism there is in media reports” (Esser et al., 2019, p. 137).
Another factor that could explain the presence of populist discourse in media cov-
erage is the occurrence of electoral campaigns (Manucci and Weber, 2017). The claim 
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that mainstream parties are “imitating” populist parties, particularly those of the popu-
list radical right, has been around for a long time. Empirical studies, however, provide 
little corroborating evidence. For example, M. Rooduijn, S.L. de Lange and W. van der 
Brug (2012) concluded in their comparative research that the programs of mainstream 
parties in Western European countries (France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and 
the United Kingdom) have not become more populist in recent years (see: Hameleers 
et al., 2017). They found no evidence that mainstream parties change their programs 
when confronted with electoral losses or successful populist challengers. Similar con-
clusions were reached by scholars in the Baltic countries, specifically with regards to 
parties in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. They found that populism is stronger in the 
“policy” dimension than in “identity formation” among mainstream parties (Jakobson 
et al., 2012; Heinze, 2017).
Still, some studies found evidence to suggest that there is some spillover effect on 
either economy (Schumacher and Van Kersbergen, 2016) or migration issues (Mei-
jers, 2017). Furthermore, all political actors competing in elections share an interest 
in strengthening their influence on the society they belong to in order to gain electoral 
support. Hence, many political actors have a tendency to focus on valence issues (such 
as corruption, jobs, economy, or crime) that are usually “owned” by the populist parties 
and presented in a negative way (Curini, 2018) during the election period. Therefore, 
mainstream political parties do tend to use populist communication style and content 
during election campaigns (Plasser and Ulram, 2003; Mudde, 2004; Bonikowski and 
Gidron, 2016; Aalberg et al., 2017; Stępińska and Adamczewska, 2017).
Previous research in various countries has made it possible to create a specific map of 
topics with high populist potential (see Figure 4.1). The aim of the analysis of the content 
of news media, presented in the later part of this section, will be to develop a map of the 
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topics covered by the media which were accompanied by statements containing elements 
of populist discourse. This analysis will be preceded by a presentation of contextual and 
situational factors surrounding populist political communication in Poland.
Contextual Factors Surrounding Populist Political Communication in Poland
In studying populist political communication in Poland it is important to recognize 
the ethnic and religious homogeneity of its population (95% declaring Polish nation-
ality [GUS, 2016a] and nearly 92% Roman Catholicism [GUS, 2018]), strong mem-
ory of World War II, the period of enforced communism in the post-war history of 
Poland, and complicated relations with neighboring countries (especially Russia and 
Germany), which results in a strong sense of national identity. These factors, consti-
tuting an important point of reference for political debate, were the rationale behind 
P. Przyłęcki’s (2012) inclusion of a negative attitude towards Germany, anti-commu-
nism, and references to tradition, history, and religion as specific indicators of Polish 
populism (Przyłęcki, 2012, pp. 119–120). In our codebook we also include a negative 
attitude towards Russia (see chapter 1).
Another important factor in the study of populist political communication is the 
specificity of the political and party system in Poland. Since 2005 we have seen a clear 
strengthening of two major parties on the political scene: Platforma Obywatelska 
(Civic Platform, hereafter PO) and Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (Law and Justice, here-
after PiS), placing many other political actors (such as Samoobrona, Ruch Palikota, 
Kukiz ’15, Wiosna, and others) in clear opposition to “those who have already been 
in power,” i.e. mainly the aforementioned PO and PiS. Their absence from power 
structures combined with programs intended to help and empower the “ordinary man” 
(pro-social programs, direct democracy) seem to exacerbate the anti-elitist attitude of 
many actors on the Polish political scene.
The Polish political scene is also decidedly right-wing. Conservative parties have not 
only been holding power in Poland since 2005, but have also fully dominated the Pol-
ish parliament (between 2015 and 2019 there was no institutional representative of the 
traditionally understood left-wing worldview). This naturally introduces ideological and 
narrative elements characteristic of right-wing populism into the discourse (national and 
xenophobic elements, racism, anti-Semitism, arguments against minority groups).
A. Lipiński and A. Stępińska (2019) identified several other factors that have cre-
ated a political, social, and cultural ‘reservoir’ to be exploited by far-right political 
parties, such as (1) voter volatility, (2) socio-economic conditions, and (3) voters’ 
opinions regarding the incumbent government. For example, they discuss a low level 
of consistency in voter behavior resulting in a high level of volatility and a low level 
of party loyalty: features that have been observed among Polish voters since the 1990s 
(see also Cześnik, 2009; 2010). They also claim that Polish voters express their distrust 
and disappointment as soon as possible, very rarely giving those who are in power an 
opportunity to further their agendas. Not surprisingly, though, some political parties 
change their labels quite frequently and eagerly adopt their politics to current social 
expectations and needs, hoping for a new chance (more about that in: Antoszewski and 
Herbut, 1999; Markowski, 2010).
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Furthermore, A. Lipiński and A. Stępińska (2019) noticed that worsening economic 
conditions increase dissatisfaction with an incumbent government which may create 
a ‘propitious context’ for populist political parties. In fact, the perceived deterioration 
of the economic situation may enhance pro-populist attitudes among the voters. De-
spite the fact that a socioeconomic situation in Poland in 2015 was remarkably healthy 
(in view of the data provided by Główny Urząd Statystyczny [Central Statistical Office 
of Poland, GUS, 2016b; 2016c]), one third of Polish people (35%) were dissatisfied 
with their economic situation (CBOS, 2015).
Situational Factors Surrounding Populist Political Communication in Poland
In addition to more general social, political, and cultural features of the Polish public 
sphere, some particular events may act as triggers for the use of populist discourse 
in the media coverage of politics. It is also worth pointing out that the analyzed re-
search material comes from the years 2015–2017 and covers the period of two election 
campaigns: the presidential campaign in May 2015 and the parliamentary campaign 
in autumn 2015. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that elections became one of the 
leading topics in the analyzed material, alongside national politics and party relations 
(with the keywords being the names of political parties and the names of politicians 
– see chapter 1).
The basic question is, therefore, what events were presented by the Polish media 
in reports on the activity of Polish political actors, especially during the election cam-
paign, and which of these events contributed to the presence of elements of populist 
discourse in the reported statements. Compiling a review of the events to which the 
media and public opinion devoted their attention in the years 2015–2017 allowed us 
to make a preliminary separation of the events in national politics with a significant 
‘populist potential’.
These included: (1) a government program Rodzina 500 plus (Family 500 
plus): 500 PLN of financial support per child for families with two or more 
children; (2) “Black protest” against governmental plans to harshen the laws on 
abortion; (3) changes in the laws concerning the judiciary system; (4) changes in 
the educational system (dismantling of junior high-schools; layoffs of teachers); 
(5) changes in the media laws (leading to politicization of the public media in 
Poland); and (6) changes in the environmental laws (permission to cut down the 
trees).
The issues intensively discussed by the media and politicians at the time also in-
cluded: the role of the referendum in the decision-making system (due to electoral 
calls made by populist political organization Kukiz’15 and its leader Paweł Kukiz), 
lowering the retirement age, relief for entrepreneurs, tax-free allowance, conversion 
of mortgage loans in Swiss francs into zlotys, and protection of agricultural land. The 
next part of the chapter will present a detailed analysis of the presence of topics related 
to these events in the printed press and the saturation of reports with the elements of 
populist discourse.
The immigration crisis in Europe, which coincided to a large extent with the par-
liamentary election campaign in 2015, was also important for determining the pres-
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ence of elements of populist discourse in the media. It became an important topic of 
this campaign, polarizing the political scene into the right-wing, clearly opposed to 
admitting immigrants, and the liberals with an ambiguous attitude toward immigra-
tion. Earlier studies (Esser et al., 2019, pp. 130–132) showed that in 2016–2017 the 
Polish newspapers did not pay much attention to this topic, but when they did, the large 
part of the reports contained elements of populist discourse. It is worth noting that in 
the analyzed period (2015–2017) the issue of refugees was only one of the aspects of 
the phenomenon of immigration – another was the massive economic migration from 
Ukraine resulting from facilitated access to the Polish labour market and the economic 
and political crisis back home.
Another important factor was the tense relations between Poland and the Eu-
ropean Union, covering such issues as: conflict over the Constitutional Tribunal, 
controversial changes in the public media introduced by the PiS government, and 
the elections for President of the European Council: Donald Tusk (a former prime 
minister from PO) won these elections despite strong opposition from the PiS gov-
ernment). While the EU blamed the PiS government for illiberal and non-democratic 
policy, the PiS government argued it was only fighting for greater autonomy within 
the European Union and strengthening of state sovereignty (so-called “not-on-our-
knees-anymore” policy) and blamed the EU for interfering into the domestic issues 
of a sovereign state. As P. Przyłęcki (2012) noted earlier, PiS has been using an 
anti-European narrative for years, accusing EU authorities of lacking democratic 
mandate and imposing costly bureaucracy. In 2016, an additional impulse to discuss 
the condition of the EU was the referendum in the United Kingdom on leaving the 
EU (Brexit).
Finally, it is worth noting an event which did not take place in the analyzed period 
but left its mark on Polish contemporary politics, namely the crash of the Polish Tu-
154M aircraft in Smolensk (Russia) on 10 April 2010, killing the Polish presidential 
couple and many prominent national politicians and military personnel. Although 
this issue could be classified as ‘historical’, it still constitutes a significant element in 
the current political dispute over the causes and culprits. Numerous conspiracy theo-
ries, the diplomatic dispute between Poland and Russia over the plane wreck which 
has not yet been handed over, the ongoing court proceedings, and the conflict over 
responsibility for this event are some of the main axes of the political dispute be-
tween the PO and the PiS parties. Since 2010, this topic has been mentioned on every 
occasion and it was therefore possible to assume that during the election campaigns 
in 2015, the subject of the disaster would generate a significant number of statements 
containing elements of populist discourse, especially anti-elitism and constructing 
‘the other’ (‘out-groups’).
The Study
We will try to draw a thematic map of Polish populist discourse in 2015–2017 
by answering the following detailed research questions: (1) What were the most 
frequently discussed topics in the collected information materials? (2) What top-
ics were most frequently discussed in materials that contained at least one element 
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of populist discourse, i.e. reference to ‘the people’, anti-elitism, or exclusion of 
‘out-groups’? (3) Which topics were accompanied by a specific type of populism 
identified by J. Jagers and S. Walgrave (2007), i.e. empty, anti-elitist, excluding, or 
complete popu lism? (4) Which topics were accompanied by additional, specifically 
Polish populist strategies? (5) What were the similarities and differences between 
the various media organizations?
The codebook contained a list of the following 21 general categories: (1) Domes-
tic politics; (2) International politics; (3) Military and defense; (4) National security; 
(5) Economy; (6) Labour-industrial relations; (7) Business, trade, industry; (8) Trans-
port; (9) Health and social work; (10) Population; (11) Education; (12) Media and 
communication; (13) Housing; (14) Environment; (15) Energy; (16) Science and tech-
nology; (17) Social relations; (18) Accidents and disasters; (19) Culture; (20) Official 
ceremonies; (21) Religion. Within these categories, specific topics were distinguished. 
Each article that contained a reference to Polish political actors was subject to coding 
in terms of topics, regardless of whether it contained at least one element of populist 
discourse or not.
The topics were assigned to the whole article, not to individual statements, so the 
unit of analysis in this chapter is a single article (not a statement, as in chapters 2 and 3. 
For each material analyzed, the encoder could use up to three codes to define detailed 
topics. They were assigned to the general topics only at a later stage of analysis (the 
categories were indicated by the first digit of the code).
The next part of this chapter will show the incidence of particular topics in press 
materials devoted to political entities, and then examine the presence of indicators of 
populist discourse in articles devoted to specific topics in individual newspapers.
Findings
Topics in Political News
Due to the specific nature of the research sample, it is not surprising that the most 
frequently discussed general topic in the materials devoted to Polish political actors 
was domestic politics. It dominated over the remaining categories, with nearly 60% 
of codes being assigned to this category, at 1.3 topics per article (i.e. one article con-
cerned more than one specific topic within the category of domestic politics).1
The second most common general topic was international politics, although it 
constituted less than 8% of all coded topics (i.e. 17% of the articles referring to at 
least one Polish political actor). Other relatively frequent general topics included 
economy (10% of articles), culture (9% of articles), and media and communication 
(8% of articles) (see Table 4.1; other general topics were present in less than 4% of 
articles).
1 Calculations of percentage occurrence of particular detailed topics in relation to the total 
number of coded topics (N=4,465) sum up to 100, while calculations based on the number of articles 
(N=2,081) do not sum up to 100 due to the fact that each article could be assigned up to 3 codes 
specifying detailed topics.
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Table 4.1. General categories of materials containing reference  








Domestic politics 2684 0.58 1.30
International politics 362 0.08 0.17
Economy 209 0.05 0.10
Culture 198 0.04 0.09
Media and communication 169 0.04 0.08
Social relations 126 0.03 0.06
National security 122 0.03 0.06
Business, trade, industry 109 0.02 0.05
Population 91 0.02 0.04
Ceremonies 90 0.02 0.04
Other <0.02 <0.04
Source: Own elaboration.
Topics related to domestic politics require a closer look. As predicted, the analyzed 
materials focused on elections (31% of all analyzed articles concerned the presidential 
or parliamentary elections held in 2015). The analysis showed that the other most fre-
quently reported topics were statements and activities of specific politicians (26% of 
articles), the executive branch (17% of articles), and inter-party relations (14%) (see 
Table 4.2; other detailed topics were present in less than 3% of articles).
Table 4.2. Detailed topics in materials in the ‘domestic politics’ category with references 
to Polish political actors
Detailed topics n 
Frequency per do-





Elections 652 0.24 0.31
Statements and activity of individual politicians 544 0.20 0.26
Activities of the executive branch 350 0.13 0.17
Inter-party relations 289 0.11 0.14
Other (domestic politics) 166 0.06 0.08
Activities of the legislature 136 0.05 0.06
Intra-party relations 126 0.05 0.06
Public opinion and public opinion polls 101 0.04 0.05
Abuse of political power and corruption 72 0.03 0.03
Issues regulated by the constitution 57 0.02 0.03
Other <0.02 <0.03
Source: Own elaboration.
Apart from the motifs concerning various aspects of domestic policy, detailed top-
ics intensively covered in the media in 2015–2017 included the activities of foreign 
politicians (4% of articles), the activities of international political organizations (4% 
of articles), and aviation disasters (3% of articles). Other topics were mentioned even 
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more rarely, with the group of topics present in 2% of the materials including journal-
ism and media, diplomatic negotiations and agreements, immigration, and interna-
tional tensions. These data confirm previous observations of the relatively high degree 
of attention paid by the media to the activities undertaken by the European Union in 
the analyzed period and to the aviation disaster in 2010.
A comparative analysis of the content of individual newspapers showed a similarly 
high level of interest in national politics, ranging from 0.89 per article in Nasz Dzien-
nik to 1.7 in Fakt. Differences in the attention paid by different media outlets to indi-
vidual topics are particularly evident in areas such as economy, media, social relations, 
and health. The right-wing weekly Do Rzeczy was distinguished by a high percentage 
of articles on international politics (38% of the articles refer to this subject), the me-
dia (16%), and national security (13%). Another right-wing weekly, W Sieci, and the 
centre-right daily, Rzeczpospolita, also published a relatively high number of materials 
on international affairs (24% and 22% of their articles, respectively). Rzeczpospolita 
also focused on economy (19% of articles).
In turn, two liberally oriented weekly magazines, Polityka and Newsweek, devoted 
more attention than other newspapers to cultural events in which Polish politicians 
were involved (19% and 11%, respectively). Interestingly, two weekly magazines rep-
resenting completely different political orientations, the right-wing weekly Do Rzeczy 
and the left-wing (liberal) weekly Polityka, devoted similar attention to the subject 
of social relations (16% and 15%, respectively). On the other hand, health and social 
service issues were most often mentioned in the tabloid Fakt (11%).
In terms of detailed topics, interesting similarities and differences can also be ob-
served between two newspapers representing completely different political orienta-
tions, i.e. the liberal Gazeta Wyborcza and the Catholic-nationalist Nasz Dziennik. 
What linked the two newspapers was the fact that immigration was one of the five 
most frequently discussed topics. What significantly differentiated them was the rela-
tively high percentage of articles devoted to constitutional and media issues in Gazeta 
Wyborcza (articles criticizing the activities of the Law and Justice government in the 
judiciary and public media), while one of the most frequently discussed topics by Nasz 
Dziennik was abortion (in the context of proposals to tighten the abortion ban and pro-
tests against them, the so-called ‘black marches’).
Populist Discourse and Topics in the News
The next step in the analysis was to identify the topics that appeared most frequent-
ly in articles containing statements with at least one element of populist discourse 
(N=1,498). There was a total of 3,255 instances of the detailed topics being used in the 
studied articles. The juxtaposition of the most frequently reported general topics also 
emphasizes the clear dominance of national politics, with more than one topic belong-
ing to this category (1.4) per article. The second most frequently discussed general 
topic was international politics, comprising 17% of the articles. It should be empha-
sized that the authors of the analyzed newspapers frequently raised issues related to 
economy (10% of articles), media and communication (7%), and culture (6%). Other 
thematic areas were less frequent (see Table 4.3).
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Table 4.3. General topics discussed in materials containing at least  





Domestic politics 2054 1.40
International politics 257 0.17
Economy 147 0.10
Media and communication 109 0.07
Culture 89 0.06
Population 68 0.04
National security 66 0.04
Other <0.04
Source: Own elaboration.
The data in Table 4.3 show that the most frequently (over 4%) reported topics 
in materials containing statements with at least one element of populist discourse 
were almost the same as in the entire sample of articles concerning Polish political 
actors (see Table 4.1) except for official ceremonies, business/trade/industry, and 
social relations. Similar conclusions can be drawn for the most frequently reported 
detailed topics: in this case, the list of topics in Table 4.4 is almost identical to the 
list in Table 4.2. This phenomenon can be explained, inter alia, by the high percent-
age of articles devoted to Polish political actors containing at least one element of 
populist discourse (72%, see chapter 2).
Table 4.4. Detailed topics discussed in materials from the ‘domestic politics’  






Statements and activities of individual politicians 395 0.26
Activities of the executive branch 278 0.18
Inter-party relations 213 0.14
Other (domestic politics) 126 0.08
Activities of the legislature 90 0.06
Inner-party relations 90 0.06
Public opinion and public opinion polls 75 0.05
Abuse of political power and corruption 62 0.04
Issues regulated by the constitution 43 0.03
Other  <0.03
Source: Own elaboration.
As in the case of the entire sample (i.e. all articles containing references to Polish 
political actors), so too in the case of materials containing statements with at least one 
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element of populist discourse we could observe some similarities and differences be-
tween media organizations.
In Do Rzeczy, Newsweek, Rzeczpospolita, and W Sieci, the second most frequently 
presented general issue after domestic politics was international politics (present in 
between 20% and 51% of articles published in the papers). In turn, in the articles pub-
lished in Fakt, Gazeta Wyborcza, and Nasz Dziennik, the other most popular general 
topic was economy (from 7% to 16% of articles). It should be noted that economy of-
ten appeared in Rzeczpospolita as well (17% of the materials published in this journal). 
Polityka, on the other hand, was particularly focused on culture (13% of the articles).
It is also worth recognizing that the authors of materials containing at least one 
element of populist discourse in Do Rzeczy and Gazeta Wyborcza often addressed is-
sues related to media and communication (19% and 9%, respectively). In addition, 
a relatively common general topic in Fakt (10%) and Nasz Dziennik (7%) was health 
and social services, while the journalists of Do Rzeczy and Polityka often wrote about 
social relations (17% and 10%, respectively).
Differences were also evident in how often certain newspapers covered specific 
topics outside of national politics. In this case, discussion of the activity of specific 
foreign politicians dominated in Do Rzeczy and Newsweek and was also clearly present 
in the weekly W Sieci. Newsweek often wrote about aviation disasters. Moreover, the 
authors of materials published in Nasz Dziennik and W Sieci, i.e. two clearly right-
wing, conservative newspapers, reported on international political organizations more 
often than journalists from other media outlets. In turn, Gazeta Wyborcza articles rela-
tively frequently focused on journalism and media, while Fakt journalists preferred to 
write about social policy. The content of Rzeczpospolita could be distinguished by the 
frequency of articles about taxes.
Separation of the most frequently discussed topics in the materials published in the 
studied newspapers was the starting point for deeper analysis of the presence of par-
ticular elements of populist discourse and particular types of populism in these articles.
Tables 4.5 and 4.6 present the most frequently reported topics in articles contain-
ing at least one element of populist discourse. For each of these topics, we established 
how often they were accompanied by references to ‘the people’, critical attitude to-
wards ‘the elite’ or ‘out-groups’, or whether a certain type of populism was present: 
empty populism (only referring to ‘the people’), anti-elitist populism (reference to ‘the 
people’ combined with criticism of ‘the elite’), excluding populism (reference to ‘the 
people’ combined with exclusion of out-groups), or complete populism (reference to 
‘the people’ with criticism of ‘the elite’ and exclusion of ‘out-groups’). The data in 
both tables show the percentage of references to a given topic that were accompanied 
by statements containing a single element or a combination of elements of populist 
discourse.
The highest presence of empty populism among articles about national politics (see 
Table 4.5) was observed in articles discussing the activities of legislators (11% of all 
references to this subject contained references to ‘the people’) and opinion polls (9%). 
In turn, indicators of anti-elitist populism were seen most frequently in articles about 
constitutional issues (70%), elections (54%), and the parliament’s activities (54%). 
Indicators of excluding populism were practically absent, while indicators of complete 
populism were present most frequently in articles covering inter-party relations (7%) 
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and activities of the national government (7%). Interestingly, for some topics criticism 
of ‘the elite’ without reference to ‘the people’ was more frequent than the presence of 
anti-elitist populism (e.g. intra-party relations, corruption, or political actors’ state-
ments and performance), while in other cases it was the opposite – anti-elitist populism 
was more frequent than elite criticism itself. This was the case with issues regulated by 
the constitution, elections, opinion polls, and the activities of legislators.
Table 4.5. Indicators of populist discourse in articles containing the most frequent topics 













Elections 542 0.07 0.36 0.003 0.54 0.002 0.01
Statements and activities of 
individual politicians 
395 0.03 0.51 0.01 0.38 0.005 0.04
Activities of the executive 
branch
278 0.01 0.49 0.01 0.37 0.007 0.07
Inter-party relations 213 0.009 0.48 0.0 0.42 0.0 0.05
Activities of legislators 126 0.11 0.33 0.0 0.54 0.0 0.05
Inter-party relations 90 0.0 0.61 0.0 0.24 0.0 0.07
Public opinion and public 
opinion polls
75 0.09 0.31 0.03 0.45 0.01 0.04
Abuse of political power, cor-
ruption
62 0.03 0.56 0.0 0.37 0.0 0.03
Issues regulated by the constitu-
tion
43 0.04 0.23 0.0 0.70 0.0 0.02
Source: Own elaboration.
Analysis of the content of media messages concerning the most popular topics 
apart from national policy (see Table 4.6) showed a higher frequency of critical state-
ments towards elites than anti-elitist populism (the exception being immigration). At 
the same time, it is worth noting that the presence of most of the individual elements 
of populist discourse – and their juxtapositions representing specific types of populism 
– were significantly lower than in the case of topics concerning national policy.
Table 4.6. Elements of the populist discourse in materials containing the most frequent 













1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Activities of foreign politicians 69 0.01 0.55 0.01 0.34 0.0 0.04
Activities of international 
political organizations 
63 0.05 0.51 0.0 0.24 0.0 0.09
Plane crash 47 0.02 0.47 0.0 0.45 0.0 0.02
Journalism and media 42 0.02 0.43 0.02 0.40 0.0 0.09
Immigration 39 0.03 0.10 0.18 0.10 0.10 0.15
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Diplomatic negotiations and 
agreements
34 0.03 0.59 0.0 0.29 0.0 0.03
International tensions and 
conflicts
29 0.14 0.45 0.0 0.31 0.0 0.10
State of the economy 26 0.04 0.46 0.0 0.42 0.0 0.04
National defense policy 25 0.04 0.56 0.0 0.32 0.0 0.0
Source: Own elaboration.
However, it is worth noting that the highest rates of critical attitude toward elites 
were recorded in articles regarding diplomatic negotiations (59%), national defense 
policy (56%), foreign politicians (55%), and international political organizations 
(51%). On the other hand, relatively high rates of anti-elitist populism were recorded 
in materials related to the plane crash (45%), the state of the economy (42%), and 
foreign politicians (34%).
Populist Discourse and Topics in Media Outlets
One of our research questions (RQ5) concerned the differences and similarities be-
tween individual newspapers regarding the types of populism found in materials on 
various topics.
In the tabloid Fakt empty populism that dominated in materials about topics such 
as referendum and opinion polling, actions of specific foreign politicians, and state-
ments on international policy, as well as budget and health policies. More than half 
of the references to these issues were accompanied by references to ‘the people’ in 
the examined articles. Empty populism was also present during discussions of issues 
related to national policy (activities of legislative authorities, elections, and statements 
and activities of specific politicians). Significantly, empty populism was also present 
in statements in articles on the Smoleńsk plane crash. Anti-elitist populism was clearly 
present in materials regarding Polish politics and economy, in particular in materials 
showing economic indicators, data on the labour market and employment, as well as 
tax scales.
The liberal daily Gazeta Wyborcza, which was critical of the political actors that 
came to power as a result of the elections in 2015, i.e. PiS and its presidential candidate 
Andrzej Duda, was characterized by a high presence (50% and more) of anti-elitist 
populism in materials devoted to national politics – mainly the activities of executive 
authorities (i.e. the government and the president) and issues regulated by the constitu-
tion, as well as military and economic activities (especially in the areas of the labour 
market and employment). Empty populism appeared in this press title mainly in mate-
rials devoted to inter-party relations, the economic situation in Poland, health policy, 
and public holidays and ceremonies.
On the other hand, Nasz Dziennik, a Catholic-nationalist daily, sympathetic to or 
even directly supporting PiS, was distinguished by a relatively low incidence of indi-
cators of anti-elitist populism in materials devoted to executive and legislative power 
(about 30%). At the same time, high rates of this type of populism (50%) were record-
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ed in materials devoted to the referendum, abuse of power and corruption, and the vote 
of no confidence in the government. Due to the political orientation of Nasz Dziennik, 
the critique focused on specific political actors (opposition and not the ruling elite). 
By the same logic we can explain the presence of indicators of anti-elitist populism 
in materials devoted to the national defense policy, peaceful demonstrations (against 
the PiS government), and strikes. Empty populism, i.e. references only to ‘the people’, 
could be found mainly in articles referring to the issue of educational reform in the 
statements of individual politicians. In turn, complete populism, combining references 
to ‘the people’, anti-elitism, and exclusion of ‘out-groups’, was detected in articles 
covering immigration and gender issues.
Rzeczpospolita, which can be described as moderately right-wing, was character-
ized by high rates of anti-elitist populism in materials discussing various aspects of 
national politics (60% to 90% of references to specific topics belonging to this the-
matic category included indicators of anti-elitist populism), international politics, and 
economy and health. Much less frequently we detected empty populism, e.g. in ma-
terials about public opinion (45.5%), activities of international political organizations 
(30%), diplomatic visits, diplomatic negotiations and agreements, economic and legal 
issues, business activities, and immigration and emigration (25% to 60%).
Among the analyzed weeklies, the centre-left Polityka was distinguished by a rela-
tively high presence of complete populism in materials devoted to the activities of 
executive bodies: almost 69% of references to the actions taken by the government 
and president were accompanied by statements containing references to ‘the people’, 
a critical attitude towards ‘the elite’, and exclusion of ‘out-groups’. In turn, there was 
a moderate level of anti-elitist populism (about 25–33%) in materials concerning the 
activity of the legislature, inter-party relations, and statements or activities of indi-
vidual politicians, as well as international politics. References to ‘the people’ alone 
could be found in Polityka mainly in texts on budget, economic activity, and social 
policy. Given the liberal orientation of the weekly, it is not surprising that there was 
a high presence of anti-elitist populism (which in this case refers de facto to the ruling 
elite, i.e. PiS) in materials on social relations, in particular in articles on gender, class, 
and family issues. It was also the only press title in which populist discourse often ap-
peared in articles on environmental protection.
Newsweek weekly was characterized by a moderate presence of anti-elitist pop-
ulism in materials concerning the activities of the legislative and executive authori-
ties and a relatively high presence in materials on elections, referendums, the airplane 
crash, and television. In addition, indicators of empty populism appeared in texts on 
emigration, culture (literature and poetry, painting and sculpture, awards and distinc-
tions), and ceremonies (state, national, religious and anniversary events).
As shown in chapter 2, the right-wing weekly Do Rzeczy was characterized by 
high rates of anti-elitist and complete populism. Analysis showed that both these types 
of populism were present mainly in materials devoted to national politics (at least 
half contained indicators of anti-elitist populism), while indicators of full populism 
were present in about 10–20% of these materials. Similar observations can be made 
in the case of articles on international politics: 50% of references to the activities of 
foreign political parties, promises of aid and international cooperation, and wars be-
tween states contained indicators of anti-elitist populism, and 20% of references to the 
74 Jakub Jakubowski, Agnieszka Stępińska, and Denis Halagiera
activities of international political organizations and international tensions contained 
indicators of complete populism. It is also worth noting the presence of indicators of 
excluding populism in materials on immigration, police activity, employment, and so-
cial policy (33% to 50%).
Also, the second conservative weekly, the right-wing W Sieci, was characterized 
by relatively high rates of anti-elitist populism (see chapter 2). Analysis of the is-
sues discussed in the materials published in the magazine shows that in the case of as 
many as 23 specific topics within the scope of 10 general categories (national policy, 
international policy, military and defense, national security, economy, social relations, 
transport, health and social care, population, media, and the environment), over 50% 
of references included indicators of anti-elitist populism. The presence of indicators 
of in articles on immigration (20%) and excluding populism in articles on immigration 
(20%) and ethnic relations (20%) should also be noted.
Specifically Polish Indicators of Populist Discourse and Topics
One of the aims of the study was to determine which topics in the press materials were 
accompanied by the aforementioned specifically Polish populist strategies: (1) Euro-
scepticism / anti-Europeanism; (2) negative attitude towards Germany; (3) anti-com-
munism; (4) social justice; (5) welfare state; (6) reference to religion; (7) reference to 
tradition and history; (8) criticism of the Third Polish Republic; (9) the Fourth Polish 
Republic; (10) critique of liberalism; (11) intervention in the free market (Przyłęcki, 
2012); (12) negative attitude towards Russia; (13) negation of political correctness; 
(14) constructing a crisis perspective (see chapter 1). It is worth noting that the pres-
ence of these strategies was recorded only when at least one element of populist dis-
course was present in a given material (references to ‘the people’, criticism of ‘the 
elite’, and/or exclusion of ‘out-groups’).
It comes as no surprise that the negative information campaign against the EU, the 
desire to contest all major decisions taken within the EU, and the aversion towards 
European integration (Euroscepticism/anti-Europeanism) could be found in materials 
devoted to international politics, especially those concerning the activities of interna-
tional political organizations, i.e. the EU (44% of all materials concerning this topic). 
It is worth noting that this strategy appeared most frequently in materials published by 
the right-wing weekly magazines Do Rzeczy and W Sieci (60% of all articles contain-
ing this strategy came from these two newspapers). Similar observations can be made 
with regard to the negative attitude towards Germany, which is reflected by references 
to World War II and/or alleged German property claims in the previously German ar-
eas in western and northern Poland: one third of materials on diplomatic negotiations 
contained this strategy and once again the two right-wing media organizations were at 
the forefront.
In the case of negative attitude towards Russia, i.e. the use of discourse consisting 
in spreading fear by referring to historic and current relations, we are again finding this 
strategy mainly in materials concerning international politics, but this time especially 
in reports on diplomatic negotiations and agreements, promises of cooperation or aid, 
war between states, and international tensions and misunderstandings. As in the case 
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of the previous two, this strategy was mainly present in the W Sieci weekly (30%) and 
also in the centre-left weekly Polityka (30%).
Apart from articles on international politics, Euroscepticism/anti-Europeanism 
could also be found in the right-wing press texts devoted to economic activity and 
legal regulations defining such activity, immigration, media regulation, and environ-
mental protection – i.e. precisely those areas in which EU bodies raised objections to 
the activities undertaken by the Polish government in the years covered by the study 
(i.e. 2015–2017). In turn, a negative attitude towards Germany could be found in ar-
ticles about transport, immigration, and the media, while a negative attitude towards 
Russia was present most frequently in articles on national ceremonies and anniversary 
ceremonies. The negative attitude towards Germany presented in the right-wing press 
should in this case be interpreted as connected to Germany’s involvement in the con-
temporary European debate regarding the activities of the Polish authorities (refusal to 
accept refugees and politicization of the Polish electronic media). However, a negative 
attitude towards Russia appeared in statements in materials on historical events (World 
War II and a post-war period).
Three other specifically Polish indicators of populist discourse: anti-communism, 
critique of the Third Polish Republic (expressed in critical statements about the period 
after 1989; the point of departure for building the Fourth Republic), and the Fourth 
Polish Republic (i.e. the idea of building a new social, political, and economic order, 
either in opposition to the Third Polish Republic or as an independent idea) mainly 
accompanied articles on national politics, and in particular texts on the activities of in-
terest groups, intra-party and inter-party relations, political nominations, judicial deci-
sions, and abuses of power. Particularly visible was the co-existence of critique of the 
Third Polish Republic and the Fourth Polish Republic in materials concerning issues 
regulated by the constitution (12% and 14%, respectively) and inter-party relations 
(13% and 6%, respectively). Therefore, it can be concluded that these strategies were 
used by the authors of statements reported by the media primarily to define and attack 
political opponents and to define their own political identity based on the construction 
of ‘us’ versus ‘them’.
At the same time, one can find such indicators as social justice (social differences 
presented as a result of unequal distribution of capital, unfair behaviors of groups 
that own the means of production, poor versus rich, calls for a new social order based 
on equal access to goods), welfare state (calls for an increase in budget deficits to 
improve quality of life, especially among the poorest; promises to increase spending 
on social, educational, housing, and health initiatives, etc.), critique of liberalism 
(liberal democracy presented as an example of a state hostile to the poor and ruled by 
corrupt neoliberal political elites alienated from society), and intervention in the free 
market (negation of free market democratic institutions; critique of the free market; 
advocating an increase in the role of the state in the economy; market regulation). All 
of aforementioned indicators were most frequently present in articles on economy 
(including employment and GDP), policy and employment in industry, business, 
the healthcare system and social service, and social relations (around 10% in many 
topics).
Finally, we noticed that references to tradition and history (events, symbols, mem-
ory, historical policy) and references to religion (reference to Christian/Catholic val-
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ues; references to persons important in the Catholic Church – including pope John 
Paul II) were used in different contexts. References to tradition and history were rela-
tively frequent in articles on constitutional issues, lobbying, and corruption, as well as 
on international politics including the activities of international political organizations, 
the activities of foreign politicians and parties, and political, military and cultural state-
ments. References to religion, on the other hand, were present mostly in articles on 
abortion, terrorism, immigration, family relations, minority – majority relations, na-
tional ceremonies, and anniversary ceremonies.
Discussion and Conclusions
Chapter 2 demonstrated the frequency with which newspaper articles about Pol-
ish political actors included statements containing elements of populist discourse, 
and chapter 3 provided insight into who the main sources of such statements were. 
In this chapter, we focused on the topics of articles in which populist statements 
were reported by the media. In particular, we wanted to identify the subjects of 
materials containing at least one indicator of populist discourse, i.e. reference to 
‘the people’, anti-elitism, and/or exclusion of ‘out-groups’, or were accompanied 
by a specific type of populism identified by J. Jagers and S. Walgrave (2007), i.e. 
empty, anti-elitist, excluding, or complete populism. Separately, we wanted to iden-
tify the incidence of specifically Polish populist strategies in materials concerning 
various thematic areas and containing at least one of the aforementioned indicators 
of populist discourse.
The results of our analysis foster several conclusions. First of all, in media cov-
erage of Polish political actors, the majority of attention in the years 2015–2017 
was paid to the choices, statements, and activities of specific politicians, activities 
of the legislative and executive authorities, as well as relations between parties and 
within parties. In about half of the cases where the presence of these topics were 
discussed, they were accompanied by either pure critique of ‘the elite’ or indicators 
of anti-elitist populism, i.e. references to ‘the people’ coupled with a critical attitude 
towards ‘the elite’.
Thus, the media image of Polish politics was characterized by the use of a conflict 
framework and strong polarization. It was also accompanied by a negative assessment 
of national politics by politicians and/or journalists. Other types of populism were 
much less frequent.
References to Polish political actors were relatively often accompanied by discus-
sion of international politics, economy, culture, or media activity. It is also possible to 
identify certain detailed topics, which in the analyzed articles appeared much less fre-
quently (i.e. in less than 2–3 percent of the articles), but were distinguished by a high 
presence of indicators of populist discourse and their specific combinations indicating 
particular types of populism. Table 4.7 presents a list of topics that were most often ac-
companied by particular types of populism (over 10% each for empty, excluding, and 
complete populism, and over 50% in the case of anti-elitist populism) regardless of 
the number of articles devoted to a given topic. Therefore, in some cases a given topic 
appeared only once or twice, and was still taken into account.
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Constitutional issues
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Financing of political organizations
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The list in Table 4.7 confirmed our assumptions about the ‘populist potential’ 
of events such as elections, protests and demonstrations, changes in public media 
law, the 2010 plane crash, and topics such as referendum, economy, social wel-
fare, immigration, and relations with the EU and neighboring countries. Among 
the topics not accompanied by the expected high level of populist discourse was 
the planned education reform in 2015–2017. As a result, it became possible to de-
velop a map that takes into account contextual and situational factors influencing 
the presence of the populist discourse in the Polish printed press in the analyzed 
period (2015–2017).
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Secondly, the study confirmed earlier observations concerning the high level of 
parallelism in Polish newspapers: the political orientation of the analyzed newspa-
pers influenced the presence of specific Polish populist strategies. Euroscepticism/
anti-Europeanism, negative attitude towards Germany, anti-communism, criticism of 
the Third Polish Republic, and the idea of the Fourth Polish Republic were found in 
right-wing oriented press materials devoted either to international or national poli-
tics. On the other hand, liberally (centre-left) oriented newspapers more often reported 
statements representing anti-elitist populism in materials devoted to gender, class, and 
social issues. The political orientation of a newspaper was also revealed by who was 
perceived as ‘the elite’ in the presented statements: the representatives of the govern-
ment (i.e. PiS in the studied period), opposition parties, or the broadly understood Pol-
ish political scene. The first approach can be found primarily in Gazeta Wyborcza and 
Polityka, the second in right-wing newspapers: Nasz Dziennik, Do Rzeczy, W Sieci, and 
the third in the tabloid Fakt.






















Source: Own elaboration based on the gathered data.
A similar observation can be made with regard to the presence of statements con-
taining indicators of excluding populism. This type of populism was mainly present 
in materials concerning immigration, employment of immigrants, social benefits for 
immigrants, or in articles describing the proposal of the Kukiz’15 political organiza-
tion to hold a national referendum regarding the admission of refugees to Poland. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that the results confirm earlier observations (Scheepers 
et al., 2002; Koopmans and Muis, 2009) on the ‘populist potential’ of refugee and im-
migration issues.
It should be emphasized, however, that the presented numerical data do not show 
the full picture of populist discourse. Quantitative analysis should be accompanied by 
qualitative analysis, which can be found in the chapter 10 of this volume, devoted to 
the construction of ‘the other’ in the discourse of the right-wing press.
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